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The Failure to Contain Communism:
State Department Reaction to the 1958 Iraqi Revolution

State Department decisions made in reaction to the 1958 Iraqi
coup affected U.S.
come.

relations with the Middle East for years to

The revolution and its aftermath tested the principles of

the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Baghdad Pact,

composed of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, formed a strategic
line of northern states designed to forestall Soviet expansion into
the Middle ~ast.' The Eisenhower Doctrine reinforced the Pact by
pledging U.S. military assistance to any Middle Eastern country in
danger from Communist aggression.

The 1958 Iraqi revolution and

its aftermath revealed them to be moribund.

U.S.

policy had not

been prepared to deal with the growth of communist power within the
Baghdad Pact nations because the United States1 intelligencegathering agencies

failed to provide

its policy-makers

adequate information on the Middle East.

with

The State Department's

reaction to the revolution and the rise of the Communist Party of
Iraq demonstrates the U.S.

government's

inability to pursue a

viable course of action in the Middle East.

'secretary of State John Foster Dulles created the Baghdad
Pact in 1955, but the U.S. government decided not to sign the
mutual-defensetreaty. Washington believed that U.S. membership in
the Baghdad Pact might
antagonize Egypt,
Iraq's
rival.
Nevertheless, the United States worked closely with the Baghdad
Pact to solve national security problems.

Many historians have studied the Iraqi Revolution of 1958' but
few scholars have looked at what the U.S. Department of State did
in reaction to the coup.
relations

with

the

United

Iraq's
States

monarchy had pursued good
and,

when

it

fell

to

revolutionaries, the State Department worried whether the new
republic would fall to the communist Party of Iraq. constrained by
a lack of adequate information, the State Department tried to
maintain friendly relations with Iraq until it became apparent that
the Communist Party had indeed risen to power within the new
regime.

By then, however, it was impossible to forcefully

overthrow the new government and the State Department found its
hands tied by political realities.

The effort to contain the

'see Ismail Al-~rif,Iraa Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the
Julv 1958 Revolution and After (New York: Vantage Press, 1982) ;
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionarv
Movements of Iraa: A Studv of Iraa's Old Landed and commercial
Classes and of its Communists, Ba8thists, and Free Officers
(princeton, N.J.: princeton university Press, 1978); riel Dann,
Jraa under Oassem: A Political History (London: Pall Mall, 1969);
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Jraa Since 1958: From
evolution to Dictatorship (New York: KPI ~imited,1987); Majid
Khadduri, Republican Iraa: A Studv in Iraai Politics since the
evolution of 1958 (Lgndon: Oxford University Press, 1969) ; and
Phebe Marr, The Modern Historv of Iraq (Boulder, Col.: Westview,
1985).
have been unable to find any other piece of work that
examines this topic. Short references concernina U.S. reaction to
the 1958 Iraqi Revolution may be found in these books:
John
Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959 (Ney York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1959); Thomas A. Bryson, American Di~10mati.c
Relations with the Middle East: 1784-1975: A Survev (Metuchen,
N.J.:
The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1977); Wilbur Crane Eveland,
Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1980); and Richard Goold-Adams, John Foster
Dulles: A Reappraisal (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
1962).
3~
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spread of communism had failed.
By the end of President Eisenhower's

administration, Iraq's

opposition to Western influence in the Middle East had evolved into
full-fledged revolutionary discontent.

Antagonized by years of

British occupation, a monarchy that behaved like the Western
powers'

puppet, and U.S.

machinations in Israel and the Gulf

region, Iraqi revolutionaries overthrew the government of ~ u r ia1
Sa'id

on 14 July 1958.

A republic rose in its place with both a

Revolutionary Council and a Cabinet under General Abd al-~arim
Qassem,

the

man

who

had

led

the

Free

Officers,

organization in the military, against the monarchy.

a

secret

Only ten days

before the coup the CIA had reported that opposition to the
monarchy was not organized well enough to present a serious
threat.4

Thus, the sudden fall of the pro-western government took

the united States by surprise.

When the revolution broke out,

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles immediately phoned president
Eisenhower to inform him of the coup but he did not have enough
information about the insurrection to advise the president of a
firm course of action.,
then instructed the U.S.

After speaking with the President, Dulles
Embassy in Iraq not to take any action

'~epartment of State, Memorandum From the ~ e p t tDirector
~
for
Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Director
of Intelligence and Research (Cunning), 3 July 1958, by W. Lloyd
George in Edward C. Keefere ed., Foreisn Relations of the United
States. 1958-1960, vol. 12, Near East Resion: Iraa; Iran; Arabian
peninsula (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government printing
Office, 1993).

that might imply that the United States recognized the new regime.'
As a precautionary measure, he also ordered an immediate halt of
all military aid to Iraq and authorized the Embassy to evacuate all
U.S.

citizens who wanted to leave the ~ o u n t r y . ~

In an inter-departmental memorandum Frank ~ i s n e r , the Deputy
Director for Plans of the CIA, argued that strong government action
by the Iraqis and a well-organized police would be able to keep any
opposition under control. When the revolution broke out, Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles immediately phoned President ~isenhower
to inform him of the coup,

but Dulles did not have enough

information to recommend a firm course of action:

"The Sec

[Dulles] has no ideas because it happened so fast but thinks we
ought to have a meeting today.
important.

NSC is set but this is more

He [Dulles] will try to accumulate info and join NSC

whenever he can and then perhaps recess and have a limited meeting
with Defense, CIA and JCS.lv7

The Secretary then instructed the

U.S. Embassy in Iraq not to take any action that might imply that
the United States recognized the new regime.8 He also ordered an
immediate halt to al-4 military aid to Iraq and authorized the

'~ele~ram
from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State,
15 July 1958, by Waldemar J. Gallman, Ambassador to Iraq, 319.
'1smail Al-Arif, Iraa Reborn: A Firsthand iccount of the July
1958 evolution and After (New York: Vantage P r q s , 1982), 62.
7~isenhowerLibrary, Memorandum of Telewhone Conversation, by
Bernau, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations, 307.
'~epartment of State, Telearam from the Embassy in Iraa to the
Department of State, by Waldemar J. Gallman, Ambassador to Iraq,
319.

Embassy to evacuate all U.S.

citizens who wanted to leave the

country. 9
The loss of one member of the Baghdad Pact to revolution
caused the State Department t a fear that other countries in the
Middle East would follow the same course unless the United States
acted to suppress further insurrections.

Great Britain feared the

loss of western oil interests in Iraq and Kuwait.

The British

government urged the United States to take military action and
prevent the spread of revolution to surrounding Middle Eastern
states. lo
ordered U.S.

To keep this from happening, President Eisenhower
troops to Lebanon in response to president Camille

Chamoun8s request

for U.S.

military

support.

The

Lebanese

President feared the possibility of an Army coup against his
government.

The message he sent to President Eisenhower on 14 July

expressed the urgency of his. situation:

"He [Chamoun] would

interpret our [United States] intentions by our deeds.

He wanted

the Sixth Fleet here [Lebanon] within 48 hours, or else he would at
last know where he stood so far as assurances from the West were
concerned. "11

In adgtion, the United States sent additional

troops to Jordan and built up the amount of ~ u r k i s h troops

'1smail Al-Arif, Iraa Reborn: A Firsthand ~ G c o u n tof the Julv
1958 Revolution and After (New York: Vantage Pre?s, 1982), 62.
'OEisenhower Library, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
Between President Eisenhower and Secretarv of State Dulles, Whitman
File, Eisenhower Diaries, 317.
"Eisenhower Library, Brief ins Notes bv Director of Central
Intelliaence Dulles, by Allen W. Dulles, DCI, 309-10.

7
stationed close to Iraq's

borders. l2

Secretary of State Dulles

approved the decision to intervene in Lebanon because of the United
States'

popularity

among

a

large

portion

of

the

Lebanese

population, but thought that the united States did not enjoy enough
support in the Middle East to successfully intervene in Iraq or any
other country.13

Dulles believed that U.S.

action in Lebanon and

Jordan would prevent Israel from acting alone to prevent the spread
of insurrection. l4

The CIA thought that Israel might decide to

take over West Jordan to the Jordan River if King Hussein's
government fell.15

Israel's

Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, had

already advised the United States that the best course of action
would be for the Baghdad Pact, and not the United Nations, to end
the revolution in lraq. l6

Contrary to U. S

.

intelligence reports,

Ben-Gurion thought that there was enough opposition in Iraq for
Turkey and Iran to intervene successfully, but only if the United
States supported them.17

Israel feared that the loss of Iraq would

12~l-~rif,
Iraa Reborn, 62.
13~isenhowerLibwry, Memorandum of Tele~hone Conversation
Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Whitman
File, Eisenhower Diaries, 317.
"Eisenhower Library, Memorandum, by ~rigadierGeneral Andrew
J. Goodpaster, Whitman Files, Eisenhower Diaries, 308.
15~isenhowerLibrary, Briefincr Notes by ~ ~ k e c t oof
r Central
Intellisence Dulles, Allen W. Dulles, White Houqe Office Files,
Staff Secretary Records, 310.
16~epartmentof State, Telecrram from the Embassy in Iraq to the
De~artment of State, by Edward B. Lawson, Ambassador to Israel,
316.

mean the subsequent loss of the Middle East, leaving them the only
democratic country in the region. 18
At the beginning of the coup, the CIA suspected that Game1
Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt and the United Arab Republic,
was behind the Iraqi revolution.

The CIA questioned, however,

whether or not the revolution had actually been directed by the
Egyptian

leader.

According

to

the

Director

of

Central

Intelligence, Allen Dulles, "The timing seemred] a little out of
gear with what might have been expected, as well as the manner and
brutality of carrying out the coup.1119 Later on the 14 July, the
U.S.

Embassy reported that the .revolution seemed to be run by the

military, including the Air Force, and that there was no sign of a
counter-movement in progress.20 Instead, the coup seemed to enjoy
considerable support from the local population and possibly from
the provincial population as well.

Ambassador Waldemar J

.

Gallman advised the State Department that the coup appeared to be
strongly anti-western and pro-Nasser

in nature and that U.S.

intervention in Lebanon would be strongly protested by the Iraqi
people. 22

19~isenhowerLibrary, Briefins Notes bv Director of Central
Intelliffence Dulle~, Allen W. Dulles, White
Off ice Files,
Staff Secretary Records, 311.

-

use

20~epartment
of State, Telesram from the Embassv in Iraa to the
De~artmentof State, by Gallman, 314.
a

21~bid.

The Soviet Union did not aniticipate the revolution would
occur but it quickly recognized the new Iraqi government on 16

J U ~ Y . ~The Soviets then initiated military exercises in the
Transcaucasus

and

Turkistan ~ilitary Districts

western military influence in Lebanon and Jordan.

to

counteract

In doing so, the

Soviets also hoped to protect the Iraqi revolution and help the new
regime of General Abdul ~ a r i mQassem to succeed.24 They protested
President Eisenhower's

decision to send troops to Lebanon and

demanded a summit conference to discuss the Middle East.
United States chose to ignore their saber-rattling.

The

The CIA

believed that the Soviets would send only limited support to Iraq
and refrain from engaging in overt actions that might instigate a
general war over the Middle ~ast.~'
On 15 July Qassem reassured Ambassador Gallman of the new
government's

intention to maintain friendly relations with the

united States.

He also assured Gallman that U.S. citizens in Iraq

would not be harmed and could leave the country safely if they
chose to do so.26 Such reassurances, however, did not convince the
State Department that-,the United States should recognize the new
Iraqi government.

By 17 July the State Department still did not

2 3 ~ 1 - ~ r i fIraa
,
Reborn, 63.
"1bid.
25~isenhowerLibrary, Briefins Notes bv Director of Central
Intellisence Dulles, by Allen Dulles, White House Office Files,
Staff Secretary Records, 311.
26~epartmentof State, Telesram from the Embassv in Iraq to the
De~artmentof State, by Gallman, 319.

know whether the revolution had been directed by Nasser and could
not identify the true leaders of the ins~rrection.'~
The United States did decide not to intervene militarily in
Iraq.

Ambassador

Gallman

reported

that

the

coup

had

been

successful not only in Baghdad but in Mosul, Kirkuk, and ~asra.'~

He reported, "that allied landings in Iraq, unless swiftly executed
in overwhelming force, would very likely lead to indiscriminate
killing and looting among Americans and Europeans (some 5,000, of
whom 2,000 British and 2,000 Americas) by mobs whom army would be
totally unable, even if willing, to control.1129 Great Britain
agreed that military

intervention was

impossible if the new

government had acquired control of the country. 30

There was no

viable figure in Iraq to lead resistance against the revolutionary
government following intervention.31
On 19 July, Ambassador Gallman expressed concern that decision
to withdraw U.S.

technical assistance from Iraq would induce the

new government to seek closer relations with the soviet Union. It
would be wiser to continue friendly relations with Iraq.
are cautious,

"If we

he wroge, I1and find in course of time that [the]

27~epartmentof State, Memorandum of conversation, by David D
Newsom, Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, 324-325.

.

28~epartmentof State, Telecrram from the ~mbgssvin Iraa to the
De~artmentof State, by Gallman, 327.
*
"Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, by Newsom,
326.

regime's

declarations of friendship are real, we may well be able

gradually to develop bases of cooperation. 13'
The next day the Division for Research and Analysis (DRN), an
intelligence bureau of the State Department, concluded that any
military action against Iraq would meet with very little popular
support in the Middle East and that Egypt and Syria would probably
come to the aid of Iraq as promised in a Mutual Defense Agreement
signed the day before.33 The DRN also warned that the soviet union
might lend support to Iraq if the United States intervened.34
reported that the new government wished to maintain

It

friendly

relations with the United States and other western powers and had
agreed to adhere to international agreements made under the Nuri
regime, to remain in the Baghdad Pact for the time being, to
refrain from nationalizing Iraqi oil, and to recognize but not join
the UAR.~' The DRN also observed that communist influence over the
new Iraqi government was minimal and advised the State Department
to approach the new government informally for reassurance of good
intentions."

Such action, they said, I8would tend to give support

32~epartmentof State, Teleuram from the Embassv in Iraa to the
De~artmentof State, by Gallman, 328.
33~epartment of State, Memorandum from the Director of
~ntelliaenceand Research (Cumminu) to the Counselor (~einhardt),
by G. Frederick Reinhardt, 329.
r
%

%bid.
35~epartment of State, Memorandum from the Director of
~ntelliuenceand Research (cumminu) to the Counselor (Reinhardt),
by Reinhardt, 330.
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to moderate and secretly pro-Western elements in the new government
and might aid in stabilizing the situation in Iraq in a pattern not
entirely unfavorable to

It seemed that Qassem was more

anti-British than anti-U.S. and was not entirely sure of where Iraq
stood with the Soviet union due to an earlier ra~rsrochementbetween
the Soviets and the ~ u r iregime. 38

The new government was also

eager to maintain the flow of technical support from the West and
therefore sought to avoid antagonizing the western powers. 39
By 23 July the new Qassem government had fulfilled U.S.
requirements for official recognition by restoring the ability of
the government to maintain control and by agreeing to uphold its
international treaties.

Assistant Secretary of State Rountree

worried that Iraq would turn to the Soviet Union if the United
States failed to recognize the hew government soon.

He noted that

the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact would like protest de iure
recognition of the new government, but insisted that protecting
U.S.

interests in Iraq was more important.40

Dulles agreed that

the United States should recognize the new government, but only
after receiving apprwal from the other members of the Baghdad

38~rielDann, Jraa Under Oassem: A Political Historv, 19581963 (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. , Ppblishers, 1969) ,
110-111.
\

39~epartmentof State, Telearam from the Embassv in Iraa to the
Department of State, by Gallman, 327.
40~epartmentof State, 'Memorandum from the Assistant Secretarv
of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African ~ f f a i r s
(Rountree) to Secretarv of State Dulles, by Stuart W. Rockwell,
Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, 332.
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Pact. 41
On 30 July President Eisenhower agreed to recognize Iraq's new
regime.

Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan

each gave their approval.42

All the countries recognized U.S.

interests in Iraq and hoped that the United States would be able to
influence the government in a positive way by recognizing it.43
By 4 August the United States had resumed friendly relations
with

Iraq.

The State Department decided to continue

sending

technical assistance to Iraq, but said that the resumption of
military aid would depend upon whether Iraq remained a member of
the Baghdad
The Ba'ath

and Communist Parties were the only two groups to

emerge from the revolution organizationally intact.45 The Ba'ath
Party, led in part by General Mohammed Rafiq Arif, supported Nasser
and sought membership with the UAR.

The Communist and National

Democratic Parties, on the other hand, did not.

These parties

inherited the new republic and began to struggle for influence in
the Qassem government.

"Department of State, Memorandum to the president, by John
Foster Dulles, 334.
43~bid.
u~epartment of State, Telearam from the ~epirtment of State
to the Embassy in Iraq, Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of
State, 335-36.
45~epartment of State, Memorandum from the Director of
Intelliaence and Research (Cummina) to Secretarv of State Dulles,
by Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 353-54.
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In late August the DNR reported increasing opposition to the
United States, including several cases of mild harassment.

Qassem

daily stated his intentions to stop the growing hostility toward
the West but seemed unable to halt the increasing antagonism
against the United States and other pro-western governments in the
Middle East such as Jordan and ~ e b a n o n .Al-Yaqdha,
~~
the first
post-revolutionary

newspaper to be printed in Iraq, published

derogatory propaganda against the United States.47
newspaper,

al-Jumhuriva,

reported

the

new

regime's

The other
official

statements of friendship toward the united States, but its tone
lacked conviction."

Baghdad radio also increasingly identified

the United States with the old monarchy in its condemnation of the
deposed Nuri government. 49
On 10 September Dulles ordered Ambassador Gallman to assess
whether or not the United States should reduce the amount of
military

personnel

government.50

in

Iraq

without

informing

the

Iraqi

He instructed Gallman to inform Qassem that the

united States planned to withdraw major U.S. military equipment and
personnel, including Fr86 aircraft, unless the government resumed

16~epartment of State, Memorandum From the Director of
~ntelliuenceand Research (Cumminu) to Secretarv of State Dulles,
by Cumming, 336.

50~epartmentof State, Teleqram from the Department of State
to the Embassv in Iraq, by John Foster Dulles, 339.

15
use of the equipment and reaffirmed existing military agreements
with the United states."

In addition, Iraq

harassing officials from the U.S.

would have to stop

Embassy, allow U.S.

military

personnel in Iraq greater freedom of movement, and put an end to
the boarding and searching of U.S. vessels in the Shatt al-Arab."
In October Gallman wrote

the State Department that the

Communist Party in Iraq had potential for greater future influence
through the return of a popular Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa
Barzani, who had been in exile for eleven years in the soviet
Union, and the alarming decline of the Ba8ath Party which left a
power vacuum for the ~ommuniststo

He also informed the

State Department that Iraq had officially resumed trade relations
with the Soviet Union.
On 3 October the CIA reported that the regime was undergoing
power struggles and that Qassem had dismissed General Arif and two
officials in his Cabinet who had been pressuring him to join the

UAR. 54

Qassem8s action

opposition furthered U.S.

in eliminating the communist Party8s
fear that the ~ommunists would gain

control of the Iraqi government.

A few days later 1raqi ~ o r e i g n

Minister Abdul Jabar Jomard informed Assistant Secretary Rountree

53~epartmentof State, Telesram from the Embassy in Iraa to the
De~artmentof State, by Gallman, 345.
54~ationalSecurity council Records, Memorandum of 381st
Meeting of the National security ~ouncil,by S. Everett Gleason,
Deputy ~xecutiveSecretary of the National security council, 341.
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that the new regime suspected, and seemed to have evidence of, a
U.S. plan to initiate a counter-revolution in ~ r a ~ . 'Qassem
~
asked
all consulates to leave Iraq in an attempt to minimize foreign
machinations against his government.

The United States worried

that it would not be able to control the new government as they had
originally thought when Qassem .approached them with words of good
will.
When General Arif returned from his post as ambassdor to West
Germany in November, Qassem had him arrested.
this

as

an

'lopen challenge1@ to

Qassem's

The DNR reported
enemies

and,

most

importantly, to Egypt and Na~ser.'~ The Director of intelligence
and Research wrote, I1SinceArif has been the chief protagonist and
symbol for the pro-UAR faction in Iraq his arrest is a public slap
at ~ a s i rwhich the latter can hardly overlook without serious
consequences for his leadership role in the Arab World.u57 On 11
November the Iraqi special High ~ilitaryCourt sentenced Arif and
two other Iraqi officials to' death.

In response, the State

Department advised Qassem that the death sentences would reflect
badly upon the regime put otherwise refrained from intervening in
what they considered an internal matter. 58

55~epartment
of State, Memorandum of Conversation, by Rountree,
342-43.
r
T

56~epartment of State, Memorandum From the Director of
~ntelliaenceand Research f~ummina)to St~cretarvof State Dulles,
by Cumming, 351-52.
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By the end of the month, Qassem had come to rely heavily on
the communist and National ~emocratic Parties for support.

He

seemed to believe it possible to exploit the ~ommunistsand then to
dismiss them once they had outlived their u s e f ~ l n e s s . ~ ~The
Communists,

however,

had

used

this

opportunity

themselves in various areas of the government.
had gained control of the propaganda machine.

to

entrench

In particular, they
The DNR informed the

Secretary of State that, W h i l e Communist infiltration probably has
not yet got out of control, the point of no return may be reached
in a few months should the Qasim regime continue on its present
course."@

Director Cumming speculated that the Iraqi army might

participate in a coup against Qassem, but would split internally
over the issue of whether or not to join the UAR.

Therefore, he

believed that the removal of Qassem would only lead to further
instability.

On the other hand, if Qassem succeeded in putting

down an army coup, he would probably owe his success to the
Communists and be further dependent upon them.61
At the beginning of December, Gallman reported that a leader
of a free officers movement had approached the Embassy with a plan
for overthrowing Qassem.

Gallman decided to check the validity of

their proposal and suggested that in the event of a coup, the
United States support it in a limited fashion #n the hopes that
-

\

59~epartment of State, Memorandum from the Director of
Intelliaence and Research (Cummina) to Secretary of State Dulles,
by Cumming, 354.
L

%bid.,

354.

18

deposing Qassem would end Communist influence in ~ r a ~ . ~The
' State
Department ordered Gallman not to deal with the free officers
movement, however.

It worried that Qassem was aware of the

insurrectionists who had approached Gallman and therefore would be
aware of any U.S. involvement in their plans to overthrow the 1raqi
government."

Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter advised

Gallman to treat the supposed insurrectionists with extreme caution
and to tell them that the United States refused to interfere in the
internal affairs of another government and could not promise to
support any government that did not yet exist.64

The State

Department had recently received troubling news that Qassem had
informed British Ambassador Michael Wright of the existence of U.S.
agents who had been sent to 1ran to work on a plot to overthrow
him."

Though Ambassador Wright denied the accusation, Qassem

refused to believe him, and the State Department did not want to
justify his fears.

Accordingly, on 11 December, Gallman met with

Qassem and tried to convince him that the united States was not
sending agents to Iran in an attempt to overthrow the Iraqi
government, but that qnemies of the united States were trying to
prejudice Qassem against the United States. 66
" ~ e ~ a r t m e n tof State, Teleuram from the Department of State
:
to the Embassy in Iraq, by Herter, 355.

&~epartment of State, Teleuram from the Embassy in Iraq to the
Department of State, by Gallman, 357.
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The State Department sent Assistant Secretary Rountree to
Baghdad to explain U.S.
arrival,

despite

policy and improve relations.

Qassemts promise

to

protect

the

Upon his
assistant

secretary from harm, Rountree met a mob instigated by the Communist
Party.

Rountree escaped the.mob safely and met with Qassem,

whereupon he tried to convince the Iraqi leader that the United
States was not involved in any insurrectionist activities against
the Iraqi government.

Qassem appeared unconvinced even though he

reassured Rountree of his desire to remain friends with the United
States.
On 18 December, at a meeting of the National Security Council,
President Eisenhower suggested that the United States help the UAR
overthrow Qassem in order to push the Communists out of ~ r a q . ~ ~
The secretary of state commented that Nasser would not allow the
Soviets to control him and agreed that it would be possible to work
with the UAR if Israel would not protest.68
the only viable option.

Nasser seemed to be

Rountree had reported that any action

taken by Turkey, Jordan, or Iran would result in antagonizing the
Iraqi people, who w o u w consider the action to be prompted by the
United States.

On top of angering the United Nations, he said,

such a move might actually foster the growth of communism in Iraq
and increase anti-western sentiment. Rountree w a ~ n e d t h a tQassemts
awareness of UAR counter-coup activity against hin would probably
67~isenhowerLibrary, Memorandum of Discussion at the 391st
Meetina of the National Security Council, by ~ a r i o n Boggs,
~xecutiveDirector, National Security Council Secretariat, 364.
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prevent him from throwing out the Communists any time soon as they
are strongly anti-UAR.
Qassem was

a

He expressed uncertainty over whether

Communist puppet

or whether

he

was

afraid

of

requesting help fromthe military or other nationalists in throwing
out the Communists and being forced to share power with them.
Rountree speculated that Nasser would be more likely to cooperate
with the United States because the Soviet Union was no longer
willing to achieve its objectives in the ~ i d d l eEast through Nasser
and were instead going through other channels.

Rountree believed

that Iraq would not become more open to the UAR than at the present
time.

They might not wish to join the UAR, but might at least

cooperate and mirror UAR policy. 69
By the new year no dissidents in the Army had made themselves
known, but the State Department believed that a majority of the
senior officers were anti-Communist and willing to oust Qassem. 70
The Director of Near Eastern Affairs, Stuart W. Rockwell, reported
that s i x anti-communist ministers had resigned from the Iraqi
cabinet.

He suspected that a new technical aid agreement between

Iraq and the Soviets Bad prompted their resignations in hopes of
removing Qassem's

support base and causing the regime to topple. 71

69~epartmentof State, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian ~ f f a ~ i r (Rountree)
s
to
~ c t i n sSecretary of State Dillon, by Rountree, 368-371.
70~epartmentof State, Memorandum from the ~irector of the
Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Rockwell) to the Assistant
Secretam of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
(~ountree),by Rockwell, 380.

The National Democratic Partyi however, had chosen to continue
support of Qassem and their ministers had remained in position.
The new ministers were more likely to be anti-U.S.

and pro-

Communist.
In February 1959 a Special ~ational Intelligence Estimate
reported that they still did not have any evidence to suggest that
Qassem himself was a member of the Communist Party, but said
he has resisted repeated demands by senior army officers
for a crackdown on local Communists. He continues to
countenance the presence in a number of key positions of
men who are probably Communists.
Iraqi
representatives at inter-Arab and Afro-Asian conferences
have consistently advocated actions beneficial to the
USSR and opposed to the interests of both pan-~rabism and
the West.
Kassim has done little about the manifest
ability of the Communists to use 'the streett in
organized mob demonstrations and mass pressure tactics.
And when confronted in early February with the group
resignation of six anti-Communist civilian cabinet
ministers--some of them recognized opposition figures of
long standing--he replaced them with men less friendly
toward Nasser and no more likely than their predecessors
to pose effective resistance to the communist^.^

. . .

The State Department believed that the Soviet Union would not
respond militarily to a coup against the Qassem government because
they did not have many interests at stake in Iraq.74 However, the

*

longer Qassem remained in power, the more likely it was that the
Soviet Union would increase its involvement in Iraq. 75
The British were less open to working with Nasser because

"~epartment of State, S ~ e c i a lNational Intellisence Estimate,
382-83.
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their relations with Iraq had been better than those of the United
States. 76

The State Department felt confident , however, that

"further rapid consolidation of leftist forces in Iraq would
probably increase UK sentiment in favor of a Nasser effort to stop
the Iraqi Communists. m n
In March Nasser instigated a coup against Qassem that failed
to bring down the Iraqi government.

State Department documents

remain classified and unavailable to the general public and it is
unknown whether or not it supported the coup.78

The Mosul coup,

as it became know, was probably the last possible attempt to
overthrow Qassem.

In a telegram to the State Department, the new

Ambassador to Iraq, John D. Jernegan, wrote, IINow [it] seems to us
that control could be wrested from Qassim only by assassination and
eventhat would not automatically result in government of different
orientation from present one.wm
After the Mosul coup, the Communist Party of Iraq gained
control of the press and various organizations such as the Trade
Union Movement, the Student Union, and the Popular Resistance
Force.

U.S.

officialq no longer had freedom of movement in Iraq

and were often subjected to searches.

Their number of Iraqi

-.

n ~ u e to Qassemfs reports of U.S. involvement in covert
activities along Iraq's borders, it is possible that the United
States helped Nasser instigate the Mosul coup with or without the
State Department's knowledge.
m~epartmentof State, Telesram from the Embassy in Iraq to the
De~artmentof State, by Jernegan, 395.

contacts had severely diminished. 80
Nasser8s failure to overthrow Qassem meant that the united
States8 influence in Iraq had come to end.

As predicted, Qassem

now owed his survival to the Communist Party and showed no signs of
throwing it out of power.
agreed to only

The one good sign was that Qassem had

two of the communist Party's

eight

demands:

withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact and the purging of government and
army officials.

Qassem purged.every ministry except the ~ o r e i g n

Office, but the Communists did not gain any cabinet positions and
one minister openly espoused the communist Party doctrine. "
The State Department decided not to sell Iraq any more arms
and to limit supplies to spare parts and ammunition for U.S.
military

equipment

that

had

already

been

sold

to

~ r a q . ~ ~

Ambassador John D. Jernegan recommended that the United States
refrain from making any official statements about the current
situation in Iraq out of fear that a statement would increase Iraqi
fear of U.S.

intervention, give substance to the charge that the

western powers were pulling Nasser8s strings as though he were a
puppet, and weaken anyeffect that Nasser8s anti-communist campaign
might possibly have on the Iraqi people. 83
Jernegan received permission to instruct special envoys to

'~epartment
of Stat&, Telesram from the Embassy to the
De~artmentof State, by Jernegan, 407.

Iraq from other countries such as Sudan, Morocco, Lebanon, ~ a u d i
Arabia, Tunisia, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, spain, ~witzerland,
Yugoslavia, India, Indonesia, and Japan. The State Department felt
that these countries might have more influence over Qassem than
Turkey or Pakistan in persuading him to do something about the
Communist party.&
Jernegan also recommended that propaganda attacks be focused
on

significant

Iraqi

communists

who

did

not

hold

official

government positions and to decrease the attacks against Qassem.
Instead he thought that the propaganda system should make Qassem
look like a staunch Arab nationalist who had fallen victim to
communist control."

And in accordance with his report, the State

Department dismissed the idea of boycotting 1raqi oil because
sanctions would serve only to anger the 1raqi people against the
United States and other western powers who might have a chance of
influencing Qassem against the Communists. 86
When Iraq left the Baghdad Pact, its members reformed into the
Central Treaty Organization.

Though U.S.

influence in the Middle

East remained strong,.,$he Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine
had lost any power it might once have had.

U.S.-1raqi

relations

spiraled increasingly downward until, a decade later, they would
cease to have any formal association with each qther.

The Batath

Party, which had supported ~as'serand the UAR, would eventually
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replace both Qassem and the Communist Party in 1963, but not before
u.s.-~raqi relations could be saved.
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